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Abstract
Can we predict how well a team of individuals will perform together? How
should individuals be rewarded for their contributions to the team performance?
Cooperative game theory gives us a powerful set of tools for answering these
questions: the Characteristic Function (CF) and solution concepts like the Shapley
Value (SV). There are two major difficulties in applying these techniques to real
world problems: first, the CF is rarely given to us and needs to be learned from data.
Second, the SV is combinatorial in nature. We introduce a parametric model called
cooperative game abstractions (CGAs) for estimating CFs from data. CGAs are
easy to learn, readily interpretable, and crucially allow linear-time computation of
the SV. We provide identification results and sample complexity bounds for CGA
models as well as error bounds in the estimation of the SV using CGAs. We apply
our methods to study teams of artificial RL agents as well as real world teams from
professional sports.
1 Introduction
Suppose we have a group of individuals out of which we need to select a team to perform a
task. Besides maximizing team performance, we also wish to reward individuals fairly for their
contributions to the team [28]. This general problem arises in many real world contexts: choosing
athletes for a sports team [25], choosing workers for a project [32], choosing a subset of classifiers to
use in an ensemble [31] etc. In this paper we ask: how can we use data on past performance to figure
out which individuals complement each other? How can we then fairly compensate team members?
Standard game theory (sometimes called ‘non-cooperative’ game theory) explicitly specifies actions,
players, and utility functions [30]. By contrast, cooperative game theory abstracts away from the
‘rules of the game’ and simply has as primitives the agents and the characteristic function (henceforth
CF) [6]. The CF measures how much utility a coalition can create. Solution concepts in cooperative
game theory have been developed to be ‘fair’ divisions of the total utility created by the coalition.
These solution concepts can be viewed either as prescriptive (i.e. this is what an individual ‘deserves’
to get given their contribution) or predictive of what will happen in real world negotiations, where the
intuition is that coalitions (or individuals) that don’t receive fair compensations will opt to leave the
game and simply transact amongst themselves.
These tools are useful for answering our main questions. The CF tells us how well a team will
perform and the solution concepts will tell us how to divide value across individuals. For the purposes
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of this paper, we consider one of the most prominent solution concepts: the Shapley Value (SV).
However, there are two hurdles to overcome.
1. The CF is unknown to us, and is combinatorial in nature, thus requiring a sensible parametric
model through which we can learn the CF from team performance data.
2. The SV requires an exponential number of operations to compute.
We introduce the cooperative game abstraction (CGA) model that simultaneously addresses both of
these issues. In addition, CGA models are interpretable so as to aid analysts in understanding group
synergy. Our main idea is motivated by a particular decomposition of the CF into an additive series
of weights that capture m-way interaction between the n players for m = 1, ..., n. When we zero out
terms of order order k+ 1 and higher, this leaves behind an abstraction, a sketched version of the real
cooperative game, which we refer to as a kth order CGA.
Our Contribution: To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to estimate characteristic functions
with lossy abstractions [15] of the true characteristic function using parametric models, and bound
the error of the estimated CF and SV. The second order variant of the CGA was first proposed in
[11]. We generalize this work to study CGA models of any order. Our theoretical contributions are
as follows: (i) sample complexity characterization of when a CGA model of order k (for any order
k) is identifiable from data (ii) sensitivity analysis of how the estimation error of the characteristic
function propagates into the downstream task of estimating the Shapley Value.
Empirically, we first validate the usefulness of CGAs in artificial RL environments, in which we can
verify the predictions of CGAs on counterfactual teams. Then, we model real world data from the
NBA, for which we do not have ground truth, using CGAs and show that its predictions are consistent
with expert knowledge and various metrics of team strength and player value.
2 Related Work
Past works on ML for cooperative games have largely been theoretical and focus either on estimating
the CF or estimating the Shapley Value directly without the CF. This differs from our goal, which is
to model both with a provably good model that demonstrates sound performance on real world data.
Modeling Characteristic Functions: As mentioned prievously, [11] is the first to consider what we
consider the second order variant of CGA. However, its focus was on the computational complexity
of the exact computation of the Shapley Value. We consider the generalization of this representation
to any order and are concerned with using lower rank CGA as an abstraction of complex games for
computational tractability. As the low rank CGA is a lossy estimator of the true CF, we study and
obtain theoretical bounds on the estimation errors of what we aim to compute: the CF and the SV.
A related work is [12] which proposes the MGH model for CFs. While the MGH model is like CGA
in that both are complete representations, it contains nonlinearity that makes it harder to optimize
and interpret. More crucially, the MPH model does not admit an easy computation of the SV. On
the other hand, there are succinct representation models proposed for CFs that do allow the SVs to
be readily computed. These are algebraic decision diagrams [1] and MC-nets [17], which represent
CFs with a set of logical rules. However, the key drawback is that these models cannot be readily
parameterized in tensor form and optimized using modern auto-grad toolkits, unlike the CGA.
Lastly, there has also been work in learning theory [3] that examines conditions under which a
characteristic function can be PAC learned from samples. This work is concerned only with the
theoretical learnability of the CF (and not the SV) for certain classes of cooperative games. By
contrast, we study a concrete, parametric model that can approximate the CF of any cooperative
game, study how approximation noise propagates into the SV and empirically verify that the model
obtains good performance on real data.
Computing the Shapley Value: There has also been work that directly approximates the Shapley
Value, without first learning the CF [4]. This differs from our goal in that we are interested in
estimating both the Shapley and the CF. The latter is needed for applications such as counterfactual
team performance prediction and optimal team formation, as we will demonstrate in the experiments.
Team Performance Analysis from Data: We note that all of the work cited above are theoretical
and do not test their model on real world data. [25] is one empirical work that does. They model
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e-Sports team performances using a 2nd order CGA. Our work differs in that i) we generalize their
model and study CGA models any order to obtain comprehensive sample complexity bounds ii) we
are interested in fair payoff assignment in addition to team strength. To this end, we show that CGA
allows for easy computation of SV and derive noise bounds for the estimated SV.
Abstraction in Games: Abstraction is an idea often used in game theory to make the computation
of solution concepts such as the Nash Equilibrium (NE) tractable. One can efficiently solve for the
NE of a abstracted game and lift the strategy to the original game. In non-cooperative game theory,
the relationship between the quality of abstraction and the quality of the lifted strategy with respect to
the original game has been heavily studied [21, 19, 20]. Our analysis characterizes the relationship
between the abstractions and the solution concept, here being the Shapley Value, for any cooperative
game. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to apply abstraction for computational
tractability in the context of cooperative games.
3 Cooperative Game Theory Preliminaries
We begin with definitions in cooperative game theory.
Definition 1. A cooperative game is defined by:
1. A set of agents A = {1, . . . , n} with generic element i
2. A characteristic function v : 2A → R
We will refer to a subset of agents C ∈ 2A for which v(C) measures how much utility a team C can
create and divide amongst themselves. A ‘fair division’ of this value can be given according to the
Shapley Value.
Definition 2. The Shapley Value of an agent i with respect to team A is:
ϕi(v) =
∑
S⊆A\i
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
The Shapley Value is typically justified axiomatically. It is the unique division of total value that
satisfies axioms of efficiency (all gains are distributed), symmetry (individuals with equal marginal
contribution to all coalition get the same division), linearity (if two games are combined, the new
division is the sum of the games’ divisions), null player (players with 0 marginal contribution to any
coalition receive 0 value). The Shapley value has been widely applied in ML, in domains such as
cost-division [36, 29], feature importance [27], and data valuation [18] to name a few.
4 Cooperative Game Abstractions
4.1 Motivation
To model the characteristic function v, a natural set of abstractions can be derived from the fact that
the characteristic function v can be decomposed into a sum of interaction terms across subsets of
agents. In what follows, we will denote abstractions of v as vˆ.
Fact 1. There exists a set of values ωS for each S = {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ A such that any characteristic
function can be decomposed into its interaction form where:
v(C) =
|C|∑
k=1
∑
S∈2Ck
ωS . (1)
where 2Ck is the set of all coalitions of size k.
Note that Fact 1 implies that CGA is a complete representation: a CGA model of order n can model
any set function. Its downside is that it has 2n parameters to be learned from data. We may elect to
truncate higher order terms and use an order k CGA model vˆ to model v instead:
Definition 3. A kth CGA model is parameterized by weight vector ω, which includes a weight ωC
for all coalitions C with |C| ≤ k. The corresponding v(C) is defined as in equation 1.
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A key property of CGA models is that the Shapley Value may be computed from a simple weighted
sum of the CGA parameters.
Fact 2. The Shapley Value of an individual i with respect to players A may be expressed as:
ϕi(v) =
∑
T⊆A\{i}
1
|T |+ 1ωT∪{i}
4.2 Learning a CGA
We learn the CGA model from samples of coalition values from v. Given hypothesis class beH, we
perform empirical risk minimization (ERM) with criterion: minvˆ∈H
∑
(C,v(C))∈DP (vˆ(C)− v(C))2
An important question that immediately follows is: when can a CGA model be identified from data?
We define an exact identification notion as below:
Definition 4. Suppose that we have a set of hypothesesH from which we will choose vˆ via minimiza-
tion of the criterion above. Suppose the dataset DP is actually generated via a true v∗ ∈ H, we say
that DP identifies v∗ if v∗ is the unique minimizer of the criterion.
Identification is an important question for three reasons. We are interested in the parameters of
the model since they will be used to (i) predict the performance of unseen teams (ii) compute the
Shapley value (iii) understand complementarity and substitutability between team members. If there
are multiple sets of parameters consistent with the data, then none of the inferences we perform to
answer those questions (e.g the marginal contribution of players) will be well defined.
We now give some sufficiency and necessity conditions on DP for v∗ to be identified exactly. These
results generalize known sample complexity bounds from [33], expanding their bounds for only
order 2 to any order k.
Theorem 1 (Sufficiency for Identification). Suppose H includes all kth order CGAs and v∗ is a
kth order CGA. If DP include performances from all teams of at least k different sizes s1, . . . , sk ∈
[k, n− 1], then DP identifies v∗.
Theorem 2 (Necessity for Identification). SupposeH includes all kth order CGAs and v∗ is a kth
order CGA. If DP contains performances of teams of only m < k different sizes, then DP does not
always identify v∗.
These results show that if the order k = O(1), identification is possible with poly(n) samples and
that if k = O(n), the number of samples becomes exponential in n. Therefore, we suggest that
practitioners should focus on the lowest order CGAs that they believe are suitable. For us, we find
that low rank, second order CGAs demonstrate good performance in our experiments.
One consideration is that these bounds may be too pessimistic in requiring exact recovery of the true
v. In the appendix, we provide sample bounds for identification of CGA under a PAC/PMAC [2]
framework (Proposition 1). In particular, we have that under the looser, PMAC approximation notion,
only O(n) instead of O(dk) samples are needed for approximate estimation of most coalition values.
5 Approximate Shapley Values
With our approximation of the CF vˆ in hand, we examine the fidelity of the SV computed from vˆ. We
denote the approximated SV of player i as ϕi(vˆ) and the real SV ϕi(v). As is typical in sensitivity
analysis, we derive bounds relating the error in v to the error in the Shapley value.
These bounds may be of independent interest since often in ML applications v is stochastic. For
instance, SV is widely used in interpretability literature [9, 10, 27, 8, 13], where v is taken to be
the model performance. The model performance is typically stochastic, since it is a function of the
random samples of data used to train the model and the randomness in the optimization, which can
converge to differing local optima due to the nonconvexity of the losses e.g of deep models.
Let ϕ(v) be the vector of Shapley Values. We start with a worst-case error bound for `2 when the
adversary can choose how to distribute a fixed amount of error into v to construct vˆ.
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Theorem 3. The `2 norm of the estimation error of the Shapley Values is bounded by:
‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖22 ≤
2
n
‖v − vˆ‖22 (2)
Though this result is tight, it assumes a non-smooth, adversarial distribution that places infinite
density on the eigenvector corresponding to the largest singular value of the SV operator. Below,
we consider average case bounds assuming that the error is of fixed norm and drawn from a smooth
distribution; this type of assumption is often used in smooth analysis [16].
Theorem 4. Assuming that v− vˆ is drawn from distribution DBr with support equal to a sphere and
smooth in that κ0 ≤ PrDBr (x) ≤ κ1 for any point x in its support, then:
Ev−vˆ∼DBr [‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖22] ≤
6
n
κ1
κ0
‖v − vˆ‖22
2n
(3)
We can generalize these results to any noise distribution thus:
Corollary 1. Suppose noise v − vˆ ∼ Dn is such that its conditional distribution satisfies κ0(r) ≤
PrDn(x|‖x‖22 = r2) ≤ κ1(r) for all r and x in Dn’s support, then:
Ev−vˆ∼Dn [‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖22] ≤
6
n
Er
[
κ1(r)
κ0(r)
(
r2
2n
)]
Intuitively, this means that if the error v − vˆ is on average spread out in that Dn is fairly smooth in
expectation across concentric spheres in its support, then the `2 error of the Shapley value is small on
average. Indeed, an astute reader may worry that only a 2n reduction in the aggregate approximation
error ‖v − vˆ‖22 is not large enough since v − vˆ ∈ R2
n
. Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 show that the SV
actually induces a 6n
κ1
κ0
scaling of the average approximation error.
We also obtain analogous worst and average-case `1 bounds with scaling factors on the same order.
Due to space constraints, please see Theorem 5 and 6 in the appendix for the results.
Lastly, we note that these bounds are general. In the appendix, we obtain a simple derivation of the
CGA-specific bias, which can be plugged into these bounds for the SV bias. Note that bias in the
estimation of the CF only arises due to model misspecification, i.e if order k is used to model a game
of order r for r > k. This description covers all cases as any CF of a game necessarily corresponds to
a CGA model of a certain order (Fact 1) and estimation error only arises due to a smaller order being
specified. Certainly, we note that more refined bounds are a natural future extension to this work.
6 Experiments
6.1 Virtual Teams
We generate team performance data from the OpenAI particle environment [26] 1. The task in this
environment is team-based and requires cooperation: 3 agents are placed in a map and 3 landmarks
are marked, and agents have a limited amount of time to reach the landmarks and are scored according
to the minimum distance of any agent to any landmark. In addition, negative rewards are incurred for
colliding with other agents. Thus, a team which can cooperate well is able to assign a single landmark
per agent in real time and spread out to cover them without colliding with each other.
We train 12 teams of agents (36 agents total) using the default algorithm and parameters from the
OpenAI GitHub repo. We then evaluate all
(
36
3
)
= 7140 mixed teams of these agents evaluated over
100000 episodes. The train/validation/test split is 50/10/40. We fit a baseline first order (where team
= sum of members) CGA and a second order CGA to predicting the final score of each team. We also
compare to a more general, state of the art model for learning set functions, DeepSet [38], which is
designed purely for prediction.
Since DeepSet contains more parameters than the CGA model, we expect it to fit data better. However,
unlike the CGA model, Deepset is (i) less easily identified due to the larger sample complexity needed
1https://github.com/openai/multiagent-particle-envs
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Figure 1: Left: Interaction matrix from second order CGA model. Players are clustered by original
training team ({0, 1, 2} trained together as did {3, 4, 5}, etc...). We see complex patterns of comple-
mentarity and substitutability as well as a clear replication of the well known fact that agents that
train together can coordinate much better than agents which are trained separately - this can be seen
in the figure by the strong complementarity in the diagonal blocks of size 3 compared to other 3× 3
off-diagonal blocks. Right: Histograms of ratios of the score attained by the completed team chosen
by the model normalized by the score of the actual best team containing a given initial agent.
(ii) not readily interpretable due to the non-linearity of φ (iii) and importantly, one cannot readily
compute or estimate the Shapely. To compute the Shapley values exactly, one would have to first
compute v(C) for each coalition C, thus requiring 2n feed-foward passes through the network. Even
to approximate the Shapley value, it is known that O(n log n) evaluations of the model (network)
are needed [18]. In contrast, to compute the Shapley with CGA, only one weighted sum of the CGA
model parameters is needed and thus takes O(1) number of evaluation.
Prediction: The first order CGA model achieves an test set MSE of of .79, the second order model
achieves an order of magnitude smaller at .07. These results show that in this environment teams are
not just sums of their parts. The DeepSet model achieves an MSE of .042, showing that we give up
some predictive accuracy (but not that much) from using the simpler 2nd order CGA. We emphasize
that the goal of this experiment is not to find the most predictive model. Rather, it is to show that the
much smaller, second order CGA model is roughly comparable to Deepset, all the while conferring
the advantages of: 1. being interpretable 2. allowing easy computation of the Shapley Value.
Interpretability: To the first point, we visualize the learned matrix V̂ of the second order CGA in a
heatmap (Figure 1) that allows us to discern players that complement/substitute each other.
Best Team Formation: For each of the 36 agents we have trained, we ask: what is the best set of 2
agents to add to them to make a team? More generally, this problem of optimal player addition is one
often faced by real world sports teams, as they choose new players to draft or sign so as to further
bolster their team performance. In this virtual setting, we can evaluate all possible additions to the
team so as to gauge the predictive performance of our models.
In our setup, we restrict only to possible teammates which the original agent was not trained with.
Figure 1 shows the histogram of ratios of the score attained by the completed team, which was
selected by the model, normalized by the score of the actual best team. While the first-order CGA
fails to construct good teams (since it does not consider any complementarities), the second order
CGA and DeepSet model achieve more than ∼ 95% of the possible value. Thus, the complementarity
patterns learned via the 2nd order CGA are, in fact, important for this task. We also note that the
second order CGA model outperforms DeepSet on this task.
6.2 Real World Sports Teams
We now consider a more complex, real world problem: predicting team performance in the NBA. We
collect the last 6 seasons of NBA games (a total of 7380 games) from Kaggle along with the publicly
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available box scores 2. Unlike in the dataset above, we do not observe absolute team performance,
rather we only observe relative performance (who wins). We model matchup outcomes using the
Bradley–Terry model. In particular, given the team strengths, the probability of team i winning in a
match against team j as:
Pr[w = 1 | vˆ, Ci, Cj ] = exp(vˆ(Ci))exp(vˆ(Ci)) + exp(vˆ(Cj))
This gives us a well defined negative log likelihood (NLL) criterion of the data D, which we optimize
with respect to vˆ. We set each team in each game to be represented by its starting lineup (5 individuals).
Then we learn vˆ such that it minimizes the negative log likelihood using standard batch SGD with
learning rate 0.001. Because basketball teams are of a fixed size (only one set of sizes), we use L2
regularization to choose one among the many possible set of models parameters.
As with the RL experiment above we compare a first order CGA, a second order CGA, and a DeepSet
model. We split the dataset randomly into 80 percent training, 10 percent validation, and 10 percent
test subsets. We set hyperparameters by optimizing the loss on the validation set.
6.2.1 Results
Prediction: How well does the CGA perform in this task? We begin by studying an imperfect metric:
out-of-sample predictive performance. First, we see that the NBA performance can be fit fairly
well with just a first order CGA - that is, we can think of most teams roughly as the sum of their
parts. The first order CGA yields an out of sample mean negative log likelhood of −.631 which is
slightly improved to −.627 under the second order CGA. We do also experiment with a third order
CGA which did not improve over the second order CGA performance. This suggests that the second
order is an apt choice for the abstraction. Finally, we observe that the DeepSet model is not able to
outperform the CGA yielding an out of sample mean NLL of −.63.
Overall, we find that predictive accuracy is low, at only about ∼ 65%, as a result of the league being
very competitive and teams being fairly evenly matched. Thus, predictive accuracy does not tell
the whole story and is not the focus of the experiment. Note that the data at hand is observational
and while players do move across teams and starting lineups change due to factors such as injuries,
time in the season, etc... who plays with whom is highly correlated across years and starting lineups
are endogenous (for example, a coach may not start one of their best players when playing a much
weaker team to avoid risking injury). Thus, we cannot evaluate counterfactual teams. Instead, we
supplement our the predictive analysis with analyses of the competing models to see if they are truly
able to extract insights from the data consistent with NBA analytics experts.
Unseen teams: We consider teams the model has not seen: NBA All Star teams. During each season,
fans and professional analysts vote to select ‘superstar’ teams of players that then play each other in
an exhibition game, which is not included in our training data. We collect every All Star team from
the time period spanning our training set and compare our second-order CGA model scores given to
All Star teams with those of 1000 randomly generated, ‘average’ teams.
Recall that in the matchup datasets, the difference in scores between two teams is reflective of the
probability that one team will win in a matchup. Thus, there is no natural zero point like when we
are predicting v directly and we have chosen one particular normalization where the average score
is zero. If our model does generalize well, it should predict that these all star teams are far above
average despite never seeing this combination of players in the training set.
We also investigate whether the CGA has learned things about whole teams (e.g “the Cavaliers usually
win”) and whether there is sufficient variation in starting lineups that we have learned the disentangled
contributions of individual players (e.g the team’s success is largely due to Lebron’s brilliance). We
investigate this by constructing synthetic ‘same-team-All-Star’ teams where we replace each player
in a real All Star team with a randomly selected teammate from their real NBA team from that year.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of scores for randomly constructed teams with red lines representing
predicted scores for the real All Star teams and blue lines for predicted scores for the ‘same-team-All-
Star’ teams. These results show that the predictive performance of the CGA in win rate prediction
comes from meaningful player-level assessment, not just that certain teams usually win (or lose).
2 https://www.kaggle.com/drgilermo/nba-players-stats
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Figure 2: Left Panel: The second order CGA predicts that All Star Teams are far above the 99th
percentile of random teams. Replacing each All Star with their team-level replacement gives much
worse teams. These results show that the predictive performance of the CGA in win rate prediction
comes from player-level assessment, and not just memorization of certain teams usually wining or
losing. Right Panel: Marginal contributions of individual NBA players, as measured by the Shapley
Value from the second order CGA, correlate well with measures of player-level value add used by
NBA analysts (VORP, Win-Share) as well as market-level value-add (salary).
Shapley Value as Individual Measure: So far we have asked whether our CGA captures team-level
performance. We now turn to asking whether it captures individual-level marginal contribution.
For each team, we compute the team members’ Shapley Values with respect to that team. Since
our dataset contains multiple years and individuals move across teams, we average an individual’s
computed Shapley values across all his teams. We correlate the Shapley Value based contribution
scores with real world metrics used to evaluate basketball players’ marginal contributions. We
consider 3 measures commonly used in NBA analytics.
First, we look at the value-over-replacement metric player3 (VORP). In basketball analytics, VORP
tries to compute what would happen if the player were to be removed from the team and replaced
by a random player in their position. Second, we look at win-share4 (WS). Win-share tries to
associate what percent of a team’s performance can be attributed to a particular player. Finally, we use
individual salaries, which are market measures of individual value add. Of course, a players’ salary
reflects much more than an individuals’ contribution to team wins and losses (e.g their popularity,
scarcity, etc...) and is extremely right tailed in the case of the NBA, so we consider its log. For each
of these metrics, for each player, we average their values across the same years as our dataset.
Figure 2 plots CGA Shapley values against these measures. We see that there is a strong positive
relationship between the CGA predicted Shapley value and other measures of individual contribution.
Taken together, these results suggest that CGA indeed learns meaningful individual-level contribution
measures, in a way that is consistent with expert knowledge.
Remark: overall, our experiments highlight the computational benefit of CGAs. In many cases like
the NBA, team sizes are small relative to the number of players. We show that this structural prior
can be encoded in a low rank CGA model, which does just as well (or better) than more complex,
agnostic estimators like DeepSet (our main baseline), and is also interpretable to the benefit of users.
7 Conclusion
Cooperative game theory is a powerful set of tools. However, the CF is combinatorial and computing
solution concepts like the Shapley is difficult. We introduce CGAs as a scalable, interpretable
model for approximating the CF, and easily computing the SV. We provide a bevy of theoretical and
empirical results so as to guide the application of CGA to model real world data.
Non-cooperative Game Theory has received much attention from the Machine Learning and AI
community [35, 23, 22, 24, 7], while Cooperative Game Theory has been less explored. We believe
3https://www.basketball-reference.com/leaders/vorp_career.html
4https://www.basketball-reference.com/about/ws.html
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that the intersection of Machine Learning and Cooperative Game Theory is rich with topics ranging
from Multi-agent RL to Federated Learning. Our broader hope is that our work provides a springboard
for future research in this area.
8 Broader Impact
In this work, we introduce and analyze a general model for team strength and player value. While our
end goal is to ensure accurate assessment of team strength, and as a result fair distribution of team
value, there is the risk of model misspecification and resultant bias in the estimators. Furthermore,
often times the team performance data we see is observational and the data we observe may be biased
due to individuals being of disparate background. Indeed, accounting for such confounding factors is
an important extension to our work that we would like to highlight.
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A Appendix to “Evaluating and Rewarding Teamwork Using Cooperative
Game Abstractions”
A.1 Identification Theorem Proofs
Theorem 1 (Sufficiency for Identification). Suppose H includes all kth order CGAs and v∗ is
a kth order CGA. If DP include performances from all teams of at least k different subset sizes
s1, . . . , sk ∈ [k, n− 1], then DP identifies v∗.
Proof. Let w be the first-through-k’th order weights we seek to learn, with the first n indices
corresponding to ωS such that |S| = 1, the next
(
n
2
)
indices corresponding to |S| = 2, and so on up
through the last
(
n
k
)
terms corresponding to |S| = k. Let v be the corresponding coalitional values
we observe.
Finding a k’th-order CGA corresponding to D can be formulated as finding a solution to Mw = v,
where matrix M is a matrix whose rows correspond to the data points and each entry in the matrix
∈ {0, 1}. For a given datapoint (S, v(S)), the corresponding row has ones in all entries corresponding
to interaction terms ωT such that T ⊆ S. Note that we only consider subset sizes ≥ k, since subsets
sizes smaller than k would not exhibit kth order interaction.
To show identifiability, it suffices to show that M has rank equal to the column size, since otherwise
the null space is non-empty and there exist multiple w which satisfies the equation. Equivalently, a
full rank matrix ensures that the optimization criterion is strictly convex and that the minimizer is
unique. Define matrix Mntk to be the submatrix consisting of all rows from all subsets of size t and
columns corresponding only to that of the k’th order weights.
M =
(first order weight ... k’th order weightrows from subsets of size s1 Mns11 ... Mns1k
... ... ... ...
rows from subsets of size sk Mnsk1 ... Mnskk
)
We will now show that we can perform row reductions on the decomposition into submatrices, such
that we end up with all zeroes below the antidiagonal.
First we note that every row inMnbk is a linear combination of rows inMnak for any a < b. Consider
a row sb corresponding to subset {i1, ..., ib}. We take all the rows in Mnak corresponding to subsets
s′ where s′ ⊆ {i1, ..., ib} and |s′| = a. We sum all
(
b
a
)
of these rows, and denote this row s′b. Looking
at a particular kth order weight, say WLOG corresponding to {i1, ..., ik} ⊆ {i1, ..., ib}, there is a
1 in this column in sb. This subset of size k shows up in
(
b−k
a−k
)
subsets of size a. Therefore, the
corresponding entry in row s′b is
(
b−k
a−k
)
. And so, we can derive that
(
b−k
a−k
)−1
s′b = sb as they both
have the same support: every subset of size k in {i1, ..., ib} can be found in a subset of {i1, ..., ib} of
size a.
Thus we may use an appropriate multiple α of the first row to replace Mnsik with a zero for any
i > 1. However, this changes the whole row, and so the j’th order term changes to Mnsij − αMns1j .
But by the same logic as for k, summing the l’th weights gives the same row scaled by
(
b−l
a−l
)
, and
thus Mnsij − αMns1j =
(
1− (
b−l
a−l)
(b−ka−k)
)
Mnsij .
The above shows that we can perform row reduction using the first row of submatrices in order to
put zeroes in the last column while retaining all submatrices in other columns (up to rescaling). But
now we may apply this logic inductively, by considering only the submatrices corresponding to first
through k− 1’th order weights and rows from subsets of size s2 or greater, and so on. We get that the
matrix M looks as follows after row reduction:
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
first order weight ... (k-1)th order weight kth order weight
rows from subsets of size s1 Mns11 ... Mns1(k−1) Mns1k
rows from subsets of size s2 M ′ns21 ... Mns2(k−1) 0
... ... ... 0 0
rows from subsets of size sk Mnsk1 ... 0 0

where M ′ns21 denotes submatrices above the antidiagonal that have been rescaled (note that the first
row does not need rescaling). It is then sufficient to show that Mns1k,Mns2(k−1)...,Mnsk1 (note that
each of these submatrices has more rows than columns) are all full rank to show M is full rank.
To do this, we first prove a lemma.
Lemma 1. When t ≥ k and n = t+ k, the matrix Mntk is full rank.
Proof. We will proceed by induction on k.
Base case (k = 1): Since k = 1 each row corresponds to an all-one row with a single zero for the agent
left out. Since we have such a row for each agent that can be left out, we get n linearly-independent
rows.
Thus the matrix is full rank.
Induction step (k > 1):
Assuming this statement holds for orders 1, . . . , k − 1. We will prove the statement for when the
order is k. To do this we will use induction on n:
Base case (n = 2k): n = 2k ⇒ t = k, and so Mntk is the identity matrix and is thus full rank.
Induction step (n > 2k): Assume the matrix is full rank for when number of players is equal
to 2k, ..., n. To prove the matrix is full rank for n + 1, consider the following decomposition of
M(n+1)(n+1−k)k.
(weights of subsets including 1 weights of excluding including 1
subsets including 1 A B
subsets excluding 1 0 C
)
Observe that matrix B corresponds to Mn(n−k)k and is thus full rank by induction hypothesis. This
means we can use linear combinations of rows of B to reduce rows in C. In particular, we can
performs row reductions such that we replace C with zeroes: For each row in C corresponding to
a team of size of n + 1 − k selected from [2, ..., n], we consider all n − k subsets of this team in
B and sum them. For any subset of this team of size k, then we see that it shows up in the sum:(
n+1−k−(k)
n−k−(k)
)
= n+ 1− 2k times. Therefore, the sum is n+ 1− 2k times the row in C.
Moreover, let D be the n+ 1− k rows from A summed together when performing the row reduction,
let the resultant matrix be D. The reduced matrix looks like:
M(n+1)(n+1−k)k =(weights of subsets including 1 weights of excluding including 1
subsets including 1 A B
subsets excluding 1 D 0
)
Then, we observe that D corresponds to a scaled version of Mn(n+1−k)(k−1), which is full rank by
the inductive assumption. The scaling factor is calculated as follows: For a subset {1, ..., k}, the k−1
elements show up in the n+ 1− k subset row of C, then shows up in (n+1−k−(k−1)
n−k−(k−1)
)
= n+ 2− 2k
of the n− k subsets. And so, D is a −n+2−2kn+1−2k scaled version of Mn(n+1−k)(k−1).
B remains unchanged after the row reduction and is full rank and thus the whole matrix is full
rank.
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With this lemma in hand we can return to the main proof. To complete the proof, we will show that
for any k, any n ≥ 2k and any t ∈ [k, n− k], Mntk is full rank.
Note that t ∈ [k, n− k]⇒ (nt) ≥ (nk) (as otherwise number of rows is already fewer than number of
columns and the matrix will have rank less than column size).
We will use induction on k.
Base case (k = 1): by Lemma 1, the matrix is full rank when k = 1 for any team size t and number
of players n.
Induction step (k > 1): assumes this holds for orders 1, ..., k − 1 and any t and n. For order k, fix
some t ≥ k, we will show the matrix is full rank for all n ≥ t+ k by induction on n. For the base
case n = t+ k the matrix is full rank by Lemma 1. For the induction step assume n > t+ k: assume
the matrix is full rank when the number of players is in {t+ k, ..., n− 1}. Now when the number of
players is n, we may decompose the matrix into columns corresponding to weights of k-size subsets
containing player 1, and rows into teams including or excluding player 1.
Mntk=
(weights of subsets including 1 weights of subsets excluding 1
subsets including 1 U1 U3
subsets excluding 1 0 U2
)
In doing so, we first observe that U1 is exactly M(n−1)(t−1)(k−1) and is full rank from the induction
hypothesis on k. Secondly, U2 = M(n−1)tk and is thus full rank by the induction hypothesis on
n. Therefore the matrix Mntk is full rank which concludes the inductive step on n. But this also
concludes the inductive step on k > 1, and thus we we get that all Mntk along the antidiagonal of M
are full rank. It follows that M is full rank, and thus Mw = v has a unique solution.
Finally, because we are choosing k subset sizes from [k, n− 1], it’s easy to see that if we sort subset
size s by
(
n
s
)
, then the jth subset size in this sorted order si is such that
(
n
sj
) ≥ ( nk−j+1), which
means the above condition applies.
Theorem 2 (Necessity for Identification). SupposeH includes all kth order CGAs and v∗ is a kth
order CGA. If DP contains performances of teams of only m < k different sizes, then DP does not
always identify v∗.
Proof. We will provide an instance when k = 2 such that v∗ is not identified. In that case m = 1,
and we may pick teams of size n− 1. That gives us ( nn−1) = n rows which is fewer than the number
of columns
(
n
2
)
+
(
n
1
)
. Thus there will be more than one solution.
Moreover, the conditions specified in Theorem 1 are also tight in the sense that: if we allowed m = k
subset sizes, but over a wider interval, thenD does not always identify v∗. To see this, consider k = 2
again. Widening the interval means the inclusion of either subset size k − 1 or n.
If we can pick k− 1, consider m = 2 subset sizes k− 1 and n− 1, which together gives (n1)+ ( nn−1)
rows, which is fewer than the number of columns
(
n
2
)
+
(
n
1
)
.
If we can pick n, consider m = 2 subset sizes n− 1 and n, which together gives ( nn−1)+ (nn) rows,
which is fewer than the number of columns
(
n
2
)
+
(
n
1
)
.
A.2 PAC Analysis
Another natural paradigm through which we may analyze sample complexity of learning a CGA
is the PAC framework. Before we proceed, a word about why PAC bounds are not our main focus
for sample complexity. One drawback of PAC bounds we considered is that it is only with high
probability that most coalition values are well approximated. Therefore, it could still be that there is
one vˆ(S) that is arbitrarily off. Thus, the resultant estimated Shapley value will inherit this large bias.
Since we hope to use the estimated Shapley Value for fair credit assignment in practice, we opt for
what may be considered more “pessimistic”, exact identification guarantees similar to those in [33].
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Below, we provide two results based on PAC and PMAC notions of approximation. We prove the
result assuming that we have correct CGA order specification. The result follows similarly when a
higher order than that of the true CF is specified.
Consider a random sample S of m (C, v(C)) data points with C uniformly sampled from 2A. There
are at most m distinct coalitional values in that sample. Call them vŜ . We will solve M
nk
Ŝ
ωˆ = vŜ
whereMnk
Ŝ
denotes the matrix consisting of all rows corresponding to coalitions in Ŝ. This is feasible
since there exist ω s.t Mnkω = v. Note that this step assuming feasibility relies on the CGA model
being of order k or higher; if not, Mnk
Ŝ
ωˆ = vŜ may not be feasible.
In both parts of the proposition below, we will appeal to uniform convergence results to show that this
construction yields a ωˆ and the corresponding vˆ such that it approximates v with high probability. In
all the sample complexity results that follow, let c denote a generic constant.
Proposition 1. Suppose v is a kth order CGA model with parameter vector ω of bounded `1 norm.
Then, with a set Ŝ of (C, v(C)) data points of size m ≥ c
(
dk+log(1/∆)
δ2
)
uniformly sampled from
2A, we may compute ωˆ and its corresponding vˆ as above such that, with probability at least 1−∆
over the samples Ŝ:
PrC∼2A [vˆ(C) = v(C)] ≥ 1− δ
Proof. The proof is motivated by the observation that ω may be viewed as a linear classifier with
dimension dk. Indeed, if ω is the true weight, then Mnkω = v, which is equivalent to:
[−MnkC , v(C)]T [ω, 1] ≥ 0 and [MnkC ,−v(C)]T [ω, 1] ≥ 0 for all C
where MnkC denotes the row of Mnk corresponding to coalition C and [a, b],a ∈ Rn, b ∈ Rm
denotes the n + m-dimensional vector obtained by concatenation of a and b. Thus, if we define
a classification task with 2 · 2N data points that have features [−MnkC , v(C)], [MnkC ,−v(C)] and
labels 1 for all the points, we know there exists a classifier f(x) = sign([ω, 1]Tx) which achieves
zero loss; here we take the sign of 0 to be 1.
Define data distribution D to be the uniform distribution over these 2 · 2N data points. A draw of size
m from D may be simulated by sampling coalitions from the uniform distribution over 2A and then
for each chosen coalition C, randomly choosing between [−MnkC , v(C)] and [MnkC ,−v(C)] with
equal probability.
Now, we are ready to prove that the vˆ satisfies the statement in Proposition 1. To do this, we use the
uniform convergence result below (Theorem 6.8 from [34]):
Lemma 2. LetH be a hypothesis class for the classifier, and let f be the true underlying classifier.
IfH has VC-dimension d, then with
m ≥ c
(
d+ log
(
1
∆
)
δ2
)
i.i.d data points x1, ...,xm ∼ D,
δ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣Prx∼D[h(x) 6= f(x)]− 1m
m∑
i=1
1h(xi) 6=f(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣
for all h ∈ H and with probability 1−∆ over the sampled data points.
By construction, the classifier defined by ωˆ, h(x) = sign([ωˆ, 1]Tx)), achieves zero empirical risk on
Sˆ since h(xi) = 1 = f(xi). So, we apply the uniform convergence result Lemma 2 with δ/2 to get
that with probability 1−∆ over the sampled data points x from D:
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δ2
≥ Prx∼D[h(x) 6= f(x)]
= Prx∼D[[ωˆ, 1]Tx < 0)]
=
1
2
PrC∼2A [M
nk
C ωˆ > vC ] +
1
2
PrC∼2A [M
nk
C ωˆ < vC ]
=
1
2
(
1− PrC∼2A [MnkC ωˆ = vC ]
)
Therefore, the guarantee for ωˆ over distribution D translates to the guarantee over the uniform
distribution 2A that vˆ = Mnkωˆ can overpredict or underpredict for at most δ percent of all coalitions.
To finish, we note that [ω, 1] belongs to the hypothesis class of linear classifiers of dimension dk + 1,
which is known to have VC Dimension dk + 1. So H = {[ω, 1] | ω ∈ Rdk} has VC dimension
d ≤ dk + 1. And so, our sample complexity needed for ωˆ to attain small generalization risk using
Lemma 2 is O(dk+log(1/∆)δ2 ).
We remark that the sample complexity needed is on the same order as that shown by Theorem 1 in
section A.1
Next, we provide a PMAC-like guarantee [2] with much smaller sample complexity.
Proposition 2. With samples of size m ≥ c
(
log(dk)+log(1/∆)
2δ2
)
uniformly sampled from 2A, we may
compute ωˆ and its corresponding vˆ as above such that, with probability at least 1 − ∆ over the
samples:
PrC∼2A [(1− )vˆ(C) ≤ v(C) ≤ (1 + )vˆ(C)] ≥ 1− δ
Proof. The proof follows from combining two known theorems adapted to our setting.
The left hand side of the probabilistic guarantee follows from a straightforward adaptation of the proof
of Theorem 5 in [4]. In particular, the only tweak to the proof is that the features of the data points
are to be instantiated as MnkC /v(C) instead of 1C/v(C). Since ω is bounded by our assumption,
we do not need to bound it in terms of values of v(C)’s as is done in the proof of [4]. We note the
loss function would then be defined as `(ω, (MnkC /v(C), y)) = [
MnkC ω
v(C) − 1]+ and ωˆ achieves zero
empirical loss because Mnk
Ŝ
ωˆ = vŜ ⇒MnkC ωˆ = vC ⇒ M
nk
C ωˆ
v(C) − 1 = 0 for all C ∈ S. Altogether,
we may arrive at the statement below:
With a set of m ≥ c
(
log(dk)+log(1/∆)
2δ2
)
coalitions uniformly sampled from 2A, ωˆ constructed as
above is such that:
PrC∼2A
[
(1− )MnkC ωˆ ≤ v(C)
] ≥ 1− δ
with probability at least 1−∆ over the samples.
The right hand side follows from a related theorem, Theorem 2 in [37] with the same change in the
data features. Again, we can verify that ωˆ achieves zero empirical loss:
With a set of m ≥ c
(
log(dk)+log(1/∆)
2δ2
)
coalitions uniformly sampled from 2A, ωˆ constructed as
above is such that:
PrC∼2A [v(C) ≤ (1 + )MnkC wˆ] ≥ 1− δ
with probability at least 1−∆ over the samples.
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With this, we can initialize both theorems with ∆/2 and δ/2. We first union bound over the random
draw of m− size samples to conclude that with probability ≥ 1−∆, both inequalities hold for ωˆ,
meaning that by union bound again for the random draw of C over 2A:
PrC∼2A [(1− )MnkC wˆ ≤ v(C) ≤ (1 + )MnkC wˆ] ≥ 1− δ
In summary, this means that under an even looser definition of approximability of the CGA model,
the sample complexity needed is much smaller: only O(log(dk)) number of points are needed. Since
dk ≤ 2n, this means at most O(n) samples are needed to estimate most of the coalition values
approximately with high probability.
Remark: more generally, we may obtain the above two guarantees under the same sample complexity
for any setting where we are looking to estimate solutions x to large scale linear programs Ax = b,
knowing apriori that ‖x‖1 is bounded. In such cases, we may obtain a PAC and PMAC-like result by
computing xˆ from randomly sampled constraints aTi x = bi. Notice here that A ∈ R2
n×dk and the
PMAC notion avoids needing the exponential sample complexity that is required to construct b to
compute an exact solution.
This result may be of independent interest.
A.3 Shapley Noise Bound Theorem Proofs
Theorem 3 (Shapley noise L2 bound). The L2 norm of the estimation error of the Shapley values is
bounded by:
n∑
i=1
(ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ))2 ≤ 2
n
∑
C∈2A
(v(C)− vˆ(C))2 (4)
Proof. First we observe that the Shapley value is a linear map R2n → Rn taking v to ϕ(v). We may
describe this map with matrix Sn ∈ Rn×2n where n is the number of players in the cooperative game.
Our work extends a line of work that studies properties of Sn, including [5] that studies its nullspace.
We have that:
||ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)||2 = ||Snv − Snvˆ||2 ≤ ||Sn||op||v − vˆ||2
It suffices then to obtain the operator norm of Sn. We know that ||Sn||op =
√
σmax(STn Sn). S
T
n Sn is
complicated to analyze, so we opt to analyze σmax(SnSTn ) since we know that the nonzero eigenvalues
of STn Sn are the same as those of SnS
T
n . SnS
T
n has nice structure in that all its off-diagonal entries
are the same and all its diagonal entries are the same.
Take the ith row of Sn, (Sn)i, we know that the entry in this row corresponding to subset S is:
1. 1n
(
n−1
|S|−1
)−1
if i ∈ S
2. − 1n
(
n−1
|S|
)−1
if i 6∈ S
Therefore, let d1 denote its diagonal entries, then:
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d1 = (Sn)
T
i (Sn)i
=
∑
S∈2[n],i∈S
(
1
n
(
n− 1
|S| − 1
)−1
)2 +
∑
S∈2[n],i6∈S
(− 1
n
(
n− 1
|S|
)−1
)2
=
1
n2
n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)(
n− 1
k − 1
)−2
+
1
n2
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)(
n− 1
k
)−2
Let d2 denote its off-diagonal entries. Consider the i, jth entry of SnSTn , we can characterize the
weights in the dot product as follows:
1. ( 1n
(
n−1
|S|−1
)−1
)2 if i, j ∈ S
2. ( 1n
(
n−1
|S|−1
)−1
)(− 1n
(
n−1
|S|
)−1
) if i ∈ S, j 6∈ S
3. (− 1n
(
n−1
|S|
)−1
)( 1n
(
n−1
|S|−1
)−1
) if i 6∈ S, j ∈ S
4. (− 1n
(
n−1
|S|
)−1
)2 if i, j 6∈ S
Therefore, when we sum these together:
d2 = (Sn)
T
i (Sn)j
=
∑
S∈2[n],i,j∈S
(
1
n
(
n− 1
|S| − 1
)−1
)2 −
∑
S∈2[n],i∈S,j 6∈S
(
1
n
(
n− 1
|S| − 1
)−1
)(− 1
n
(
n− 1
|S|
)−1
)
−
∑
S∈2[n],i6∈S,j∈S
(− 1
n
(
n− 1
|S|
)−1
)(
1
n
(
n− 1
|S| − 1
)−1
) +
∑
S∈2[n],i,j 6∈S
(− 1
n
(
n− 1
|S|
)−1
)2
=
n∑
k=2
(
n− 2
k − 2
)(
n− 1
k − 1
)−2
− 2
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 2
k − 1
)(
n− 1
k
)−1(
n− 1
k − 1
)−1
+
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 2
k
)(
n− 1
k
)−2
It’s easy to check that d1 > d2 since d2 = (Sn)Ti (Sn)j ≤ ||(Sn)i||2||(Sn)j ||2 = (Sn)Ti (Sn)i = d1.
And so, we may write:
SnS
T
n = (d1 − d2)In + d21n
where 1n is the all ones matrix.
This allows us to characterize all the eigenvalues of SnSTn and in particular the biggest one.
If the SVD of 1n = UDUT , then we know that D is a diagonal matrix with one entry being n as this
is an eigenvalue of 1n and the rest being 0 since 1n is only rank 1. And so,
SnS
T
n = U [(d1 − d2)In + d2D]UT
This means that the top eigenvalue is d1 − d2 + n · d2 and the rest are all d1 − d2.
Evaluating d1 − d2 + n · d2 = d1 + (n− 1)d2:
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d1 + (n− 1)d2 = 1
n2
(
n−2∑
k=2
(
n− 1
k − 1
)−1
+
(
n− 1
k
)−1
+ (n− 1)[k − 1
n− 1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)−1
− 2 k
n− 1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)−1
+
(
n− 2
k
)(
n− 1
k
)−2
]) +
1
n2
r
=
1
n2
((
n−2∑
k=2
k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)−1
+
(
n− 1
k
)−1
− 2k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)−1
+ (n− 1)
(
n− 2
k
)(
n− 1
k
)−2
) +
1
n2
r
=
1
n2
((
n−2∑
k=2
−k
(
n− 1
k − 1
)−1
+
(
n− 1
k
)−1
+ (n− 1− k)
(
n− 1
k
)−1
) +
1
n2
r
=
1
n2
((
n−2∑
k=2
−k!(n− k)!
(n− 1)! + (n− k)
k!(n− 1− k)!
(n− 1)! ) +
1
n2
r
=
1
n2
r
It just remains to evaluate r which are the residual terms from the sums, they are:
r = [1 + 1 +
1
n− 1 ] + [1 +
1
n− 1 + 1] (from the two sums in d1)
+ (n− 1)(([1 + n− 2
(n− 1)2 ]− 2[
1
n− 1 +
1
n− 1 ] + [1 +
(n− 2)
(n− 1)2 ]) (from the three sums in d2)
= 4 +
2
n− 1 + 2n− 2− 4 +
2(n− 2)
n− 1
= 2n
To summarize, we get that:
σmax(SnS
T
n ) = d1 + (n− 1)d2 =
1
n2
2n =
2
n
⇒ ||Sn||op =
√
σmax(STn Sn) =
√
σmax(SnSTn ) =
√
2
n
which proves that ||ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)||2 ≤
√
2
n ||v − vˆ||2 (4), as desired.
The above is a worst case analysis by computing the largest singular value of the Shapley matrix.
It turns out, most singular values of the Shapley matrix are very small and won’t lead to a large
amplification of the noise in the characteristic function.
We perform average case analysis by assuming that the error in the characteristic function is drawn
uniformly from a smooth distribution, which is not very "peaky" anywhere, over all noise v − vˆ with
the same L2 norm.
Theorem 4. Assuming that v− vˆ is drawn from distribution DBr with support equal to a sphere and
smooth in that κ0 ≤ PrDBr (x) ≤ κ1 for any point x in its support, then:
Ev−vˆ∼DBr [‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖22] ≤
6
n
κ1
κ0
‖v − vˆ‖22
2n
(5)
Proof. To obtain the bound in the theorem, we first prove the lemma below:
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Lemma 3. Let DBr be a distribution with support equal to a sphere with radius r and smooth in
that κ0 ≤ PrDBr (x) ≤ κ1 for any x in its support. Consider any matrix A ∈ Rm1×m2 :
Ex∼DBr [‖Ax‖22] ≤
κ1
κ0
Tr(ATA)
m2
· r2
Proof. Since ATA is symmetric and thus diagonalizable, consider its m2 orthonormal eigenvectors
u1, ..,um2 . We know that u1, ..,um2 forms a basis of Rm2 and we can then write any x in the
support of DBr as
∑m2
j=1 αjuj . Moreover,
r2 = ‖x‖2 = (
m2∑
j=1
αjuj)
T (
m2∑
j=1
αjuj) =
m2∑
j=1
α2j
since uTj ui = 0 for i 6= j and ‖uj‖22 = 1.
Define D′Br to be the distribution over α that corresponds to each x drawn from DBr and set
SD′ be its support (which may be characterized as a m2 dimensional standard simplex as defined
by (α21/r
2, ..., α2m2/r
2). We abuse notation in letting x(α) be the corresponding x to coefficients
vector α. It’s a 1-1 correspondence, and so from the smoothness assumption on DBr , PrD′Br (α) =
PrDBr (x(α)) ∈ [κ0, κ1].
Define k∗ = arg maxk∈[m2] Eα∼D′Br [α
2
k], then for any i 6= k∗:
Eα∼D′Br [α
2
k∗ ] =
∫
SD′
α2k∗ PrD′Br (α)dα
≤
∫
SD′
α2k∗κ1dα
=
∫
SD′
α2iκ1dα
≤
∫
α2i
κ1
κ0
PrD′Br (α)dα
=
κ1
κ0
Eα∼D′Br [α
2
i ]
where the second equality follows from the symmetry of the support of DBr , which is a sphere.
This implies that:
Eα∼D′Br [α
2
k∗ ] ≤
∑m2
j=1
κ1
κ0
Eα∼D′Br [α
2
j ]
m2
=
κ1
κ0
Eα∼D′Br [
∑m2
j=1 α
2
j ]
m2
=
κ1
κ0
r2
m2
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Therefore:
Ex∼DBr [‖Ax‖22] = Ex∼DBr [xTATAx]
= Ex∼DBr [x
T (
m2∑
j=1
αjλjuj)]
= Eα∼D′Br [
m2∑
j=1
λjα
2
j ]
=
m2∑
j=1
λjEα∼D′Br [α
2
j ]
≤ Eα∼D′Br [α
2
k∗ ]
m2∑
j=1
λj
≤ κ1
κ0
r2
m2
m2∑
j=1
λj
Using this Lemma 3, we can then perform an average case analysis:
E[‖Snx‖22] ≤
κ1
κ0
Tr(STn Sn)
2n
‖x‖22 =
κ1
κ0
Tr(SnS
T
n )
2n
‖x‖22
We know that Tr(SnSTn ) = nd1 so the average case multiplier of the noise is:
d1 =
1
n2
n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)−1
+
1
n2
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)−1
=
1
n2
(2 +
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)−1
+
(
n− 1
k
)−1
)
=
2
n2
+
1
n2
(
n−1∑
k=1
(k − 1)!(n− k − 1)!(k + n− k)
(n− 1)! )
=
2
n2
+
1
n(n− 1)(
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 2
k − 1
)−1
)
=
2
n2
+
2
n(n− 1) +
1
n(n− 1)(
n−2∑
k=2
(
n− 2
k − 1
)−1
)
≤ 2
n2
+
2
n(n− 1) +
1
n(n− 1)((n− 3)
(
n− 2
1
)−1
)
=
2
n2
+
3n− 7
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
≤ 6
n2
So, the multiplier is κ1κ0
6
n2n over the distribution DBr .
Next, we can obtain a more general result by integrating across all L2 norms r that v − vˆ can take.
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Corollary 1. Suppose noise v − vˆ ∼ Dn is such that its conditional distribution satisfies κ0(r) ≤
PrDn(x|‖x‖22 = r2) ≤ κ1(r) for all r and x in Dn’s support, then:
Ev−vˆ∼Dn [‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖22] ≤
6
n
Er
[
κ1(r)
κ0(r)
(
r2
2n
)]
Proof. This follows from iterated expectation:
Ev−vˆ∼D[‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖22] = Er[Ev−vˆ∼DBr [‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖22 | ‖v − vˆ‖22 = r2]]
≤ Er
[(
κ1(r)
κ0(r)
6
n2n
)
r2
]
=
6
n2n
Er
[
κ1(r)
κ0(r)
r2
]
where the inequality holds by Theorem 4.
Remark: Therefore, if Er[κ1(r)κ0(r)r
2] = cEr[r2] for some constant c = O(1), then the error in the
Shapley value is fairly small and proportional to O(1/n) of the average L2 error of v − vˆ.
Theorem 5 (Shapley noise L1 bound). The sum of absolute errors in Shapley values is bounded by:
n∑
i=1
|ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ)| ≤
∑
C∈2A
|v(C)− vˆ(C)| (6)
Assuming there is no error in estimating the grand coalition nor the empty set and n ≥ 3, then we
can give a stronger bound on the sum of absolute errors:
n∑
i=1
|ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ)| ≤ 2
n
∑
C∈2A
|v(C)− vˆ(C)| (7)
Furthermore, assume players are divided into m equal sized teams, G1, ..., Gm, where |Gi| = N/m.
Then if we compute their Shapley values just with respect to their own teams we get:
n∑
i=1
|ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ)| ≤ 2m
n
∑
C∈2A
|v(C)− vˆ(C)| (8)
Proof. We can express the difference in Shapley value for i as:
|ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ)| = | 1
n
∑
S⊆[n]\{i}
(
n− 1
|S|
)−1
([v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})]− [v(S)− vˆ(S)])|
≤ 1
n
∑
S⊆[n]\{i}
(
n− 1
|S|
)−1
(|v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})|+ |v(S)− vˆ(S)|)
=
1
n
n−1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
s
)−1 ∑
S⊆[n]\{i},|S|=s
(|v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})|+ |v(S)− vˆ(S)|)
Thus, for any S of size s:
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• If it contains element i, its L1 v error is weighted by (n−1s−1)−1.
• If it doesn’t, it is weighted by (n−1s )−1.
Observe that the unweighted RHS is equal to:
=
1
n
n−1∑
s=0
∑
S⊆[n]\{i},|S|=s
(|v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})|+ |v(S)− vˆ(S)|)
=
1
n
∑
S⊆[n]\{i}
|v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})|+
∑
S⊆[n]\{i}
|v(S)− vˆ(S)|
=
1
n
||v − vˆ||1
Therefore, since
(
n−1
s
)−1 ≤ 1 for s ∈ [0, n− 1]:
|ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ)| ≤ 1
n
n−1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
s
)−1 ∑
S⊆[n]\{i},|S|=s
(|v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})|+ |v(S)− vˆ(S)|)
≤ 1
n
||v − vˆ||1
Summing across all i’s, this proves inequality (6).
Note that
(
n−1
s
)−1
= 1 holds only for (i) the full set [n] (s = n − 1) (ii) the set {i} (s = 0) (iii)
empty set (s = 0) (iv) set [n]\{i} = [−i] (s = n − 1). Thus we can obtain equality if all of the
errors in v lie in estimating the full set or the empty set. This makes the bound tight.
We obtain a stronger inequality (7) if we assume that there is no error in estimating the empty nor the
grand coalition value:
Let e = ||v − vˆ||1 and ei = |v({i})− vˆ({i})|+ |v([−i])− vˆ([−i])|. Then:
|ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ)| ≤ 1
n
n−1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
s
)−1 ∑
S⊆[n]\{i},|S|=s
(|v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})|+ |v(S)− vˆ(S)|)
≤ 1
n
ei +
1
n
n−2∑
s=1
(
n− 1
s
)−1 ∑
S⊆[n]\{i},|S|=s
(|v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})|+ |v(S)− vˆ(S)|)
≤ 1
n
ei +
1
n(n− 1)(e− ei)
since
(
n−1
s
)−1 ≤ 1n−1 for s ∈ [1, n− 2].
Summing this across i gives:
|ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)| ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
ei +
1
n(n− 1)(ne−
n∑
i=1
ei)
=
e
n− 1 +
n− 2
n(n− 1)(
n∑
i=1
ei)
≤ e
n− 1 +
n− 2
n(n− 1)e
=
2e
n
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since
∑n
i=1 ei ≤ e.
This proves inequality (7).
In some case, as is the case with our NBA experimental setup, players are divided into m groups,
G1, ..., Gm, and we wish to compute their Shapley values only with respect to their own groups. We
can follow a similar analysis as above to derive a bound on the Shapley values. For player i ∈ Gj :
|ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ)| = | 1|Gj |
∑
S⊆Gj\{i}
(|Gj | − 1
|S|
)−1
([v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})]− [v(S)− vˆ(S)])|
≤ 1|Gj |
∑
S⊆Gj\{i}
(|Gj | − 1
|S|
)−1
(|v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})|+ |v(S)− vˆ(S)|)
=
1
|Gj |
|Gj |−1∑
s=0
(|Gj | − 1
s
)−1 ∑
S⊆Gj\{i},|S|=s
(|v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})|+ |v(S)− vˆ(S)|)
Let Ej =
∑
S⊆Gj |v(S) − vˆ(S)|. It’s clear that
∑m
j=1Ej ≤ e since any two teams Gj1 , Gj2 are
disjoint for j1 6= j2 and thus don’t have any subsets in common; note our assumption that the empty
set is estimated without any error by vˆ.
To maximize the cumulative error, all the errors in e should be placed in subsets S with S ⊆ Gj for
some j. So WLOG we can assume that
∑m
j=1Ej = e. Using inequality (7), we get that:
∑
i∈Gj
|ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ)| ≤ 2Ej|Gj |
So the overall bound is:
|ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)| ≤
m∑
j=1
2Ej
|Gj |
Assume |Gj | = n/m for each j, this simplifies to 2mn e and proves inequality 8.
While the above bounds are tight, the analysis is worst case. For instance, for the first bound we
provide, equality holds when all the error in the ‖v − vˆ‖1 vector is in the coalition value of the grand
coalition or the empty set. Below, we provide a simple, average case analysis to show that on average,
a randomly drawn error vector leads to a small increase in L1 Shapley error in expectation.
Theorem 6 (Average case Shapley noise L1 bound). Assuming that the error v − vˆ is such that
the vector |v − vˆ|/r (where absolute value is coordinate wise) is drawn from distribution DSr with
support equal to the surface of a 2n-simplex and smooth in that κ0 ≤ PrDSr (x) ≤ κ1 for any point
x in its support, then:
Ev−vˆ∼DSr [‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖1] ≤ 2
κ1
κ0
‖v − vˆ‖1
2n
(9)
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Proof.
Ev−vˆ∼DSr [|ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ)|] = Ev−vˆ∼DSr
∣∣ 1
n
∑
S⊆[n]\{i}
(
n− 1
|S|
)−1
([v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})]− [v(S)− vˆ(S)])∣∣

≤ 1
n
n−1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
s
)−1 ∑
S⊆[n]\{i},|S|=s
(
Ev−vˆ∼DSr
[
[|v(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S ∪ {i})|]+
Ev−vˆ∼DSr
[|v(S)− vˆ(S)|])
(1)
≤ 1
n
n−1∑
s=0
(
n− 1
s
)−1 ∑
S⊆[n]\{i},|S|=s
(
κ1
κ0
r
2n
+
κ1
κ0
r
2n
)
=
2
n
κ1
κ0
r
2n
where (1) is due to the following:
Let subset C∗ = arg maxC Ev−vˆ∼DSr [[|v(C) − vˆ(C)|] and subset C ′ =
arg minC Ev−vˆ∼DSr [[|v(C)− vˆ(C)|]:
Ev−vˆ∼DSr [[|v(C∗)− vˆ(C∗)|] =
∫
|v(C∗)− vˆ(C∗)|PrDSr (v − vˆ)d(v − vˆ)
≤
∫
|v(C∗)− vˆ(C∗)|κ1d(v − vˆ)
(2)
=
∫
|v(C ′)− vˆ(C ′)|κ1d(v − vˆ)
≤
∫
|v(C ′)− vˆ(C ′)|κ1
κ0
PrDSr (v − vˆ)d(v − vˆ)
=
κ1
κ0
Ev−vˆ∼DSr [[|v(C ′)− vˆ(C ′)|]
(3)
≤ κ1
κ0
( r
2n
)
.
Here (2) holds by symmetry as the expectation of any two vector coordinates under a uniform
distribution over the simplex of vectors is the same. (3) holds because every vector in the support of
DSr has L1 norm of r,
∑
C Ev−vˆ∼DSr [|v(C)− vˆ(C)|] = Ev−vˆ∼DSr [
∑
C |v(C)− vˆ(C)|] = r and
so by our choice of C ′, Ev−vˆ∼DSr [|v(C ′)− vˆ(C ′)|] ≤ r2n .
Summing Ev−vˆ∼DSr [|ϕi(v)− ϕi(vˆ)|] across all i gives the result.
This means that, on average, for a randomly drawn ϕ(v)−ϕ(vˆ) with a fixed error budget in L1 error,
the L1 error in the Shapley is only proportional to the average error in estimating each coalition. Next,
we can obtain a more general bound by integrating across all L1 norms r that ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ) can take.
Corollary 2. Suppose noise v − vˆ ∼ Dn is such that its conditional distribution satisfies κ0(r) ≤
PrDn(x|‖x‖1 = r) ≤ κ1(r) for all r and x in Dn’s support, then:
Ev−vˆ∼Dn [‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖1] ≤ 2Er
[
κ1(r)
κ0(r)
( r
2n
)]
Proof. This follows from iterated expectation:
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Ev−vˆ∼D[‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖1] = Er
[
Ev−vˆ∼DSr
[‖ϕ(v)− ϕ(vˆ)‖1 | ‖v − vˆ‖1 = r]]
≤ Er
[(
κ1(r)
κ0(r)
2
2n
)
r
]
= 2Er
[
κ1(r)
κ0(r)
r
2n
]
where the inequality holds by the Theorem above.
Remark: Therefore, if Er[κ1(r)κ0(r)r] = cEr[r] for some constant c = O(1), then the error in the
Shapley value is fairly small and proportional to the average expected L1 error Er[r]2n .
A.4 Discussion about CGA-Specific Errors:
Since CGA is a complete representation, every game may be expressed as a CGA of some order (see
Fact 1). And so, we may plug the CGA-specific bias into the general bounds obtained previously in
Theorems 3-6.
Below we derive CGA bias due to model misspecification. Note that the approximation is lossy only
when the true game is generated by a CGA model of order r and we model it with a simpler CGA
model of order k with k < r. When we model the game with a CGA of a higher order than the actual
game, it is clear that we can learn a set of weights that would fit the coalition values exactly (since v
would be in the columnspace).
Let Mnk denote the matrix relating the parameters ω to the coalitional values v. It is a 2n × dk
matrix of the form:
(first order weights ... kth order weightsrow corresponding to null coalition {} ... ... ...
... ... ... ...
row corresponding to grand coalition A ... ... ...
)
The CGA model parameters ωˆ we learn will be such that:
ωˆ = arg min
w
‖Mnkw −Mnrω∗r‖22
This is just equivalent to projecting vector Mnrω∗r onto the columnspace spanned by Mnk. Recall
from our identification theorem thatMnk has enough rows to be full rank, which makes (Mnk)TMnk
positive definite and invertible; if there are not enough samples, we may instead consider a regulariza-
tion term that will make the matrix invertible. Define projection matrix Pnk:
Pnk = M
nk(((Mnk)TMnk)−1(Mnk)T
This means that the misspecification error e(n, k, r) may be expressed as:
e(n, k, r) = (I − Pnk)Mnrω∗r
which we may plug into our noise bounds for the Shapley value computation.
Unlike the Shapley matrix, the error matrix (I − Pnk)Mnr does not seem to admit a closed form
for its trace. Instead, we perform simulations to better understand its properties. In particular, we
look to understand if it enjoys the same "averaging-effect" as the Shapley matrix. We compute
the max eigenvalue and the average trace norm value sweeping over all n, r, k for k < r < n for
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n ∈ [2, 15] (we try these sizes since 15 is the largest possible before the error matrix’s size exceeds
that permitted by our machine memory). Our simulations suggest that its largest eigenvalue (for
the worst case bound) and the average trace value (for the average case bound per Lemma 3) both
grow monotonically with n and r (fixing a k). Altogether, this suggests that the `2 error can grow
arbitrarily large with model misspecification.
A.5 Proofs of Facts
For completeness, we provide proofs of the two facts listed.
Fact 1 (Unique decomposition form). There exists a unique set of values ωS for each subset S ⊆ A
with |S| ≤ k such that the characteristic function can be decomposed into its interaction form where
v(C) =
|C|∑
k=1
∑
S∈2Ck
ωS . (10)
Proof. We can show this inductively. For the base case when |C| = 1 we have wC = v(C), which is
unique.
Induction step: assume wS′ is uniquely determined for |S′| = 1, ...,m − 1. Then for a particular
subset |S| = m:
v(S) =
m−1∑
i=1
∑
S′∈2Si
wS′ + wS
and thus wS is uniquely determined since we must set it to
w(S) = v(S)−
m−1∑
i=1
∑
S′∈2Si
wS′
Fact 2 (Shapley value expression). The Shapley Value of an individual i with respect to team A can
be expressed as:
ϕi(v) =
∑
T⊆A\{i}
1
|T |+ 1ωT∪{i}
Proof. The Shapley value for player i is defined as:
ϕi(v) =
1
n
∑
S⊆A\{i}
(
n− 1
|S|
)−1
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
Plugging in the decomposition form:
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) =
∑
S′⊆S
wS′∪{i}
Thus, the Shapley value for i is only a function of all wS where i ∈ S.
Given a subset T = {i1...it}, let us derive the weighted sum of wT occurrences in ϕi1(v). This term
only appears if {i2, .., it} ⊆ S but i1 /∈ S. And so, the weighted sum of occurrences is:
1
n
∑
S⊆A\{i1},{i2,..,it}∈S
(
n− 1
|S|
)−1
=
1
n
n−1∑
s=t−1
(
n− 1
s
)−1(
n− t
s− (t− 1)
)
26
Similarly, wT has the same sum of weighted occurrences in expressions for players i2, ..., it. And so,
by efficiency (since v(A) contains exactly wT and the sum of Shapley payments equals v(A)), they
must be assigned equal portions of wT , i.e wT /|T |. This holds for all subsets T. And so, a player i’s
Shapley value is the sum of all weights wT /|T |, for all subsets T ⊆ [n] and i ∈ T .
A.6 Relationship to the Core
The main text of the paper has focused on the solution concept of the Shapley Value. Another
commonly used solution concept in cooperative game theory is known as the Core [14]. Let n be the
number of players in the game, the Core is an allocation x ∈ Rn that satisfies:
(i) Efficiency:
∑
i∈[n] xi = v([n])
(ii) Stability: for any coalition C ⊂ [n]: ∑
i∈C
xi ≥ v(C)
Intuitively, a payoff vector is in the Core if it incentivizes every coalition C to stay with the grand
coalition rather than leave, achieve a value of v(C) and split it amongst themselves in some other
way.
The Core of a game may be empty, though an extension known as the Least Core is always guaranteed
to exist. The Least Core can be computed by solving the following linear program:
mine,x e
s.t.
∑
i∈[n] xi = v([n])∑
i∈C xi ≥ v(C)− e ∀S ⊂ [n]
Intuitively, the Least Core is the allocation which minimizes the subsidy e required to incentivize all
coalitions to stay together. We call the minimum subsidy needed the Least Core value. Unfortunately,
[11] show that for any CGA model with order higher than 1, it is NP-Complete to compute the Least
Core Value.
One notable allocation in the Least Core is the Nucleolus. For a given allocation x, define deficit
function ex(C) = v(C)−
∑
i∈C xi. Order all subsets of [n] according to the deficit function ex. The
nucleolus is defined as the imputation which lexicographically minimizes this ordering of deficits.
Intuitively, the Nucleolus is the "inner-most" allocation in the Least Core. In general, the Nucleolus
is difficult to compute and requires solving a series of exponential-size linear programs.
Remarkably, [11] prove the following fact:
Fact 3. Assuming the characteristic function of the underlying game is a second order CGA model,
the Shapley Value is in the Least Core (in fact, it is the Nucleoulus).
Therefore, we can simply compute the Shapley value to obtain a point in the Least Core. All that
remains is to approximate the Least Core value. To do this, we establish an approximate notion of the
Least Core value by adapting a similar notion from [4] and derive a simple sample complexity bound
for estimating this value. The definition goes as follows:
Definition 5. Given an allocation x, a value e is a δ−probable least core value if:
PrC∼2A [
∑
i∈C
xi + e ≥ v(C)] ≥ 1− δ
The least core value is the smallest e∗ such that there exist an allocation for which e∗ is a 0−probable
least core value.
We will compute a δ−probable least core value by computing the sample least core value on a set of
uniformly sampled coalitions Ŝ. Certainly if |Ŝ| = 2n coalitions, then the sample least core value
will be the true least core value exactly. Using standard learning theory tools, we can relate the quality
of the estimation of the least core value, in terms of δ, to the size of the samples Ŝ needed:
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Theorem 7. Given a set Ŝ of m = O( log(1/∆)δ2 ) coalitions uniformly sampled from 2
A, let:
eˆ = arg min e∑
i∈C ϕi(vˆ) ≥ v(C)− e ∀C ⊆ Ŝ
then with probability 1−∆ over the samples, eˆ is a δ−least core value.
Proof. We prove this through a simple learning theory setup analogous to the proposition above.
Define a 2-dimensional linear classifier with weightswe = [e, 1]. This class of classifier is a subset
of all linear classifiers of dimension 2 and thus has VC dimension ≤ 2.
For each of the 2n − 2 inequality constraints, construct data point [1,∑i∈C ϕi(vˆ) − v(C)] that
corresponds to coalition C’s constraint. We assign each data point a label of 1. Notice that if classifier
we = [e, 1] classifies [1,
∑
i∈C ϕi(vˆ)− v(C)] correctly, then:
signwe([1,
∑
i∈C
ϕi(vˆ)− v(C)]) = 1⇒ [e, 1]T [1,
∑
i∈C
ϕi(vˆ)− v(C)] ≥ 0⇒
∑
i∈C
ϕi(vˆ) ≥ v(C)− e
Moreover, we know that the classifier we obtain, weˆ = [eˆ, 1], is such that it classifies all the samples
in Ŝ correctly by construction, and has zero empirical risk. Again, using Lemma 2, we know that this
classifier’s performance on the samples generalize to all 2n − 2 constraints. In particular, if there are
at least
O(
2 + log(1/∆)
δ2
)
samples in Ŝ, then the empirical least core value eˆ we compute is such that:
PrC∼2A [
∑
i∈C
ϕi(vˆ) ≥ v(C)− eˆ] = PrC∼2A [signweˆ([1,
∑
i∈C
ϕi(vˆ)− v(C)]) = 1] ≥ 1− δ
Lastly, we remark that for games whose characteristic functions are CGA models of order higher
than 2, the Shapley is not the Nucleolus. An interesting extension of this work could be developing
faster, sample-based methods for computing the Least Core with higher order CGA models.
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L2 regularization/Vˆ Rank 1 2 5 10 20 35
0.001 0.256 0.092 0.066 0.067 0.068 0.069
0.01 0.261 0.104 0.091 0.090 0.093 0.090
0.1 0.679 0.679 0.652 0.646 0.669 0.664
Table 1: Results of hyper-parameter sweep for the second order CGA in the OpenAI particle world
experiment. MSE is shown, lower is better.
L2 regularization/Vˆ rank 5 10 20 50 100
0.001 0.61 0.6214 0.6086 0.5971 0.5929
0.01 0.64 0.6414 0.6414 0.6429 0.6429
0.1 0.6214 0.63 0.62 0.6286 0.6242
Table 2: Results of hyper-parameter sweep for the second order CGA in the NBA data. Model
accuracy is shown, higher is better.
A.7 Experiments Hyper Parameter Search
In the low rank approximations of V̂ (as suggested by [25, 33]), we represented a team C via a
one-hot encoding xC and fit a model of the form:
vˆ(C) = wTxC + x
T
C Vˆ xC
We tried parameterizing Vˆ via a low-rank matrix and swept weight decay (l2 regularization) parame-
ters on our validation set. Here we report the results of the full sweep for both of our experiments.
Table 1 shows the MSE (lower is better) of the performance prediction for various parameter values in
the OpenAI particle world experiment. Table A.7 shows the accuracy of the model in predicting wins
(higher is better) in the NBA experiment. In both cases we see that a relatively low rank model does
very well at capturing structure in our environments. The main text analyzes the models resulting
from these parameter choices.
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